The normality of the exception in democracy’s empire by Fitzpatrick, Peter & Joyce, R.
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 
research output of Birkbeck College 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
 
 
Fitzpatrick, Peter and Joyce, Richard 
(2007). The normality of the exception in 
democracy’s empire. Journal of Law and 
Society 34 (1) 65-76. 
 
 
This is an author-produced version of a paper published in Journal of Law and 
Society (ISSN 0263-323X). This version has been peer-reviewed but does not 
include the final publisher proof corrections, published layout or pagination. 
All articles available through Birkbeck ePrints are protected by intellectual 
property law, including copyright law. Any use made of the contents should 
comply with the relevant law. © The authors and Cardiff University Law 
School. Published by Blackwell, the definitive version is available at 
www.blackwell-synergy.com  
 
 
Citation for this version: 
Fitzpatrick, Peter and Joyce, Richard (2007). The normality of the exception in 
democracy’s empire.  London: Birkbeck ePrints. Available at: 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/696 
 
 
Citation for the publisher’s version: 
Fitzpatrick, Peter and Joyce, Richard (2007). The normality of the exception in 
democracy’s empire. Journal of Law and Society 34 (1) 65-76. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk
Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk
The Normality of the Exception in Democracy’s Empire 
 
PETER FITZPATRICK AND RICHARD JOYCE *
 
 
The motif is one of inversion. In its received mode, the exception – the 
exceptional decision suspending the normal legal order – generates both the 
sovereign and the law. Here, on the contrary, the exception is found to be of the 
‘normal’ law and, thus endowed, law goes to constitute the sovereign. This 
normality of the exception is then matched with the sovereign claim of 
democracy’s empire. That empire is thence shown to have an oxymoronic quality, 
democracy and its constituent law being conducive to empire yet ultimately 
opposed to it. The empire of the United States provides a ‘case’. 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Guantanamo is influentially taken to be the paradigm for our time of the state of 
exception and its attendant sovereign rule.1 In this rendition, so to speak, Guantanamo 
is a place of pervasive sovereign control where people are comprehensively contained 
beyond the law. Yet it has been cogently shown that law flourishes in this very scene 
supposedly devoid of it.2 This revisionist account of Guantanamo indicates at least 
that there is a question about the adequacy of the received version of the exception 
and its attendant sovereign rule. The abrupt answer offered here is that the exception 
to the law is itself of the law and that the exception’s attendant sovereign rule is 
constituted by law. Such an answer is then related to the sovereign claim of 
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democracy’s empire. In the result, democracy and its law are found to be conducive to 
empire yet also and ultimately opposed to it. The empire of the United States provides 
a telling ‘case’. 
 
THE RECEIVED EXCEPTION 
 
The inevitable starting point is Schmitt’s pronunciamento: ‘Sovereign is he who 
decides on the exception.’3 There is a dual constitution involved here. The immediate 
one is the constitution of the sovereign. The consequential constitution is that of a 
distinct legal order. It is the sovereign who, in deciding when a state of exception 
exists and the normal legal order has to be suspended, also decides what is the normal 
legal order.4 The normal order is one of a ‘boring’, repetitive application of pre-
existent rules.5 ‘In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust of a 
mechanism that has become torpid by repetition’.6 The exception is, then and of 
necessity, illimitable. It ‘cannot be circumscribed factually or made to conform to a 
preformed law’.7 Rather, it ‘frees itself from all normative ties;’ it ‘departs…from the 
legal norm’.8
That is one side of the story. The other has to do with the primacy of law and the 
sovereign’s dependence on it. That side will be recounted shortly. Its intimations are, 
however, already present in Schmitt’s account. The sovereign decision on the 
exception needs the norm to which it is exceptional. Hence for Schmitt the exception 
only suspends the legal order. This legal order remains in the wings ever awaiting its 
return. And return it must if there is to be a sustaining of the norm to which the 
exceptional can continue to be exceptional. But that is not all. Law invades the realm 
of the exception, and does so despite the surpassing determinative force which 
Schmitt would accord the decision on the exception. Law constitutes the terms in 
which the exception can be decided on; it ‘suspend[s] itself’; and although the 
sovereign ‘stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to 
it’; and sovereignty remains ‘a juristic concept’, or remains ‘within the framework of 
                                                 
3 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (2005, tr. G. Schwab) 5. 
4 id., p. 13. 
5 id., p. 15. 
6 id. 
7 id., p. 6. 
8 id., pp. 12, 13. 
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the juristic’.9 Nor is it simply the case that the sealed completeness of the decision on 
the exception is contaminated by legal matter – rather, the contamination is mutual. 
The exceptional inhabits the norm. With the operation of the norm, and for Schmitt, 
the ‘autonomous moment of the decision recedes to a minimum’,10 but it exists. There 
is always ‘space’ for the norm in itself to be other than what it may be at any one 
time, ‘space’ for the entry from within the domain of the legal order itself of what is 
exceptional to the norm. In the like vein, Schmitt recognizes that ‘every juristic 
decision’ involves a generative creativity, that it cannot simply be read off from what 
is already there but that it entails ‘an independently determining moment’.11 The 
mutual contamination of the exception and the legal order will soon prove crucial for 
an argument placing the exception in and as law, but what must be considered first is 
another hugely influential elevation of the surpassing exception and of its attendant 
sovereignty, an elevation that now becomes pointedly challenging for it incorporates 
within itself a contamination that for Schmitt seemed merely to derogate from the 
purity of the separation between the sovereign exception and the legal order.  
Agamben’s exception has the same components as Schmitt’s but the composition 
of each is different. For Schmitt the decision on the exception ‘frees itself from all 
normative ties’.12 Agamben’s exception likewise frees itself but not as an occasional 
suspending of an otherwise distinctly enduring legal order. Rather, the exception now 
continuously enters into and comprehensively subordinates the legal order:  
Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide deployment. 
The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by 
a governmental violence that – while ignoring international law externally and 
producing a permanent state of exception internally – nevertheless still claims to be 
applying the law.13
The exception ‘everywhere becomes the rule’ says Agamben,14 and whereas for 
Schmitt the exception brings with it ‘the power of real life [which] breaks through the 
crust’ of the legal order, for Agamben the exception itself becomes a power ruling 
pervasively over life.15
                                                 
9 id., pp. 6-7, 12, 13-14, 16. 
10 id., p. 12. 
11 id., p. 30. 
12 id., p. 12. 
13 Agamben, op. cit., n. 1, p. 87. 
14 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998, tr. D. Heller-Roazen) 9. 
15 Schmitt, op. cit., n. 3, p. 15; Agamben, op.cit., n. 14, generally. 
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The disparity between these lines of thought carries over into the relation between 
sovereignty and the exception. For Schmitt, as we saw, the sovereign is constituted as 
‘he who decides on the exception’, and that power of decision somehow ‘becomes in 
the true sense absolute’ – something it would have to become if it is to match the 
illimitable exception.16 With Agamben it is ‘life that constitutes the first content of 
sovereign power’, and the ‘production’ of that life is ‘the originary activity of 
sovereignty’, an originating sovereignty within which ‘law refers to life and includes 
it in itself by suspending it’.17 In so doing sovereignty assumes complete control over 
that life – a life that is thence decidedly ‘bare’.18 It is not only that this bare life is 
produced by sovereignty; it is the very power over bare life that constitutes 
sovereignty.  
That aside, in its encompassing of life, of life that remains infinitely protean if 
now bare before sovereignty and its law, sovereign power would have to be at least 
co-extensive with life. How that could be or how it could be known to be is left aptly 
mysterious. Indeed, where the sovereign of Schmitt and of Agamben comes from is a 
mystery. Most immediately, it floats on tautology. The decision of Schmitt’s 
sovereign creates the exception which creates the sovereign. Agamben’s sovereign is 
constituted by the bare life it produces. More intriguingly, in both cases there is the 
evocation of a sacred foundation to sovereignty. Schmitt’s sovereign is announced 
into existence in the opening sentence of a work on ‘political theology’, the gist of 
which Schmitt explains in this way: 
All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological 
concepts not only because of their historical development – in which they were 
transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the 
omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their 
systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological 
consideration of these concepts.19
Part of this systematic structure not exactly recognized by Schmitt is that his 
sovereign would have to be deiform in order to fuse its determinate presence with the 
                                                 
16 Schmitt, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 5, 12. 
17 Agamben, op.cit., n. 14, p. 28. 
18 id., pp. 11, 83. 
19 Schmitt, op. cit., n. 3, p. 36. Even more strongly: ‘The juridic formulas of the omnipotence of the 
state are…only superficial secularizations of the theological formulas of the omnipotence of God’: C. 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1996, tr. G. Schwab) 42. 
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illimitability of the exception. That same fusion endows Agamben’s sovereign, only 
in his case it derives from an ersatz sacred tradition.20
Even if a quixotic credence were allowed these grounds of sovereignty, an 
intriguing irresolution would remain. Schmitt’s overweening sovereign, as we saw, 
remained ‘a juristic concept’ and ‘belongs to…the normally valid legal system’, a 
system able to decide autonomously even if Schmitt would arbitrarily confine this 
ability ‘to a minimum’21. The inability of Agamben’s sovereign to contain the law can 
be discerned more obliquely. The pervasion of this sovereign, its commensuration 
with life, is qualified by Agamben’s finding that this is a catastrophe which is coming 
rather than already realized, and a catastrophe that could somehow in life be 
reversed.22 So, this sovereign is less than comprehensive in its effective coverage of 
life, but the law it supposedly encompasses and subordinates is not so restricted but 
remains co-extensive with suspended life. This law becomes attenuated or is 
eventually eliminated only in Agamben’s expectation of a new form of life alternative 
to the coming catastrophe.23
 
THE LAW OF THE EXCEPTION 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Not without a touch of the tendentious, then, we find Schmitt and Agamben 
instancing persistent irresolutions in Jurisprudence and in the field of Law and 
Society. Law is autonomous, or has some significant degree of autonomy. Yet law is 
receptively subordinated to some other power, usually conceived in terms of society 
or sovereign. There are various mediations of this divide. In Jurisprudence, for 
example, law has been notably endowed with a ‘core’ of stilled meaning and with a 
‘penumbra’ of receptive adaptability.24 Nothing remotely resembling a general line of 
division between these categories has been identified. Taking another example, now 
from the domain of Law and Society, a ‘constitutive theory’ would have it that whilst 
                                                 
20 For an account and criticism of which see P. Fitzpatrick, ‘Bare Sovereignty: Homo Sacer and the 
Insistence of Law’ in Politics, Metaphysics and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer, ed. 
A. Norris (2005) 49-73. 
21 Schmitt, op. cit., n. 3, pp. 12, 16. 
22 Agamben, op.cit., n. 14, pp. 12, 153, 188. 
23 id., p. 29; Agamben, op. cit., n. 1, p. 64. Cf. the law seemingly amenable to the new form of life 
which Agamben evokes in G. Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy (1999, tr. D. 
Heller-Roazen) 165; and G. Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the 
Romans (2005, tr. P. Dailey) 122. 
24 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) 125, 149. 
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indeed society constitutes or ‘shapes’ law, law also constitutes or ‘shapes’ society.25 
Again, no dividing line has been identified, and no barrier to stop either pervading the 
other. The corresponding alternation with Schmitt would have the sovereign 
generating the legal order and law not only retaining an autonomy but also 
constituently inhabiting the sovereign realm. With Agamben, the contrast, as we saw, 
was one in which a sovereign power encompassing life subordinated a law of equal 
extent, yet this same sovereign power also found itself to be less extensive than life 
leaving the extent of law’s own relation to life undiminished. 
That these contraries are not simply stark oppositions can be discerned in a more 
practical perspective on law. The notion of autonomous law usually imports law’s 
providing some determinate reference, some available concentration of enforceable 
relations between us, some present normative hold on the futurity of our being 
together. To do all this, however, law has to be continually receptive to the ever-
changing quality of those relations and of that futurity. Once, so the moderns say, 
these two dimensions of law, the determinate and the receptive, could be joined in a 
transcendent determination. Resort could be had to a deific or sacral resolution much 
like those evoked by Schmitt and by Agamben. Modernity is bereft of such resort. As 
the iterative tomes of Jurisprudence attest, no resolution is to be found in one side of 
the division or the other. Law cannot subsist as fixedly determinate. For law to 
accommodate the ever-pending infinity of possible relation in our being together, it 
must be utterly receptive. Yet if it were only receptive, it would be purely evanescent 
and, in the result, a vacuity.  
More constructively, and more to our overall point, law is continuously constituted 
in a connecting receptivity to what is ever beyond its determinate self. The call for 
law always comes from beyond its determinate realisation for the time being. If law 
could not actively and receptively respond to that call, it would wither in cumulating 
irrelevance. But for law to bring what is beyond into its determinant existence, it must 
be of a position apart from that existence, a position that opens to, and that can be held 
open to, what is beyond its determinate existence. Yet that same position apart must 
also be one that resists what is beyond, selecting and gathering it in terms which 
maintain a connection generatively affirming law’s continuing and determinate 
                                                 
25 A. Hunt, Explorations in Law and Society: Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law (1993), e.g. 174-5. 
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existence. This position is that of the exception, the exception now as normal.26 This 
position is, then, like Schmitt’s exception in that it combines being beyond and yet of 
the existing ‘legal order’.  
That self-transcendent position of law also positions the exaltation of the 
sovereign in both Schmitt’s and Agamben’s accounts of the exception. ‘Law itself’, 
says Nancy, ‘does not have a form for what would need to be its own sovereignty’.27 
In its responsiveness to the infinity of possible relation in our being together, law has 
to be ever changeful and, in some ultimate sense, a vacuity. As such, it cannot in 
itself, in any formed self, enduringly unite its determinate and receptive dimensions. 
That same vacuity, however, renders law intimately receptive to power. And it is in 
the formation of the ‘modern’ national polity that we find a power endowing law, a 
power concentrated in the persistence of a pre-modern conception of sovereignty.28 
Taking matters that far would help explain the subjection of law to the sovereign 
within Schmitt’s and Agamben’s exception. What would still need explaining would 
be the saturation of Schmitt’s sovereign exception with legal matter and Agamben’s 
unwitting extension of law beyond the sovereign power that somehow also 
encompassed it. 
For sovereignty to endow law with determining force, for it to bring together 
effectively the determinate and receptive dimensions of law, it must share those 
dimensions with law. In modernity, and like law, sovereignty cannot seek resolution 
of disparate dimensions in some transcendent reference apart from itself. Hence its 
starkly dual characteristics delimited by Derrida. Sovereignty, says Derrida, ‘is 
undivided, unshared, or it is not’; yet he would ask: ‘What happens 
when…[sovereignty] divides? When it must, when it cannot not divide?’29 There is 
some merging of these seeming opposites when Derrida talks about ipseity in terms of 
‘the sovereign and reappropriating gathering of self in the simultaneity of an 
                                                 
26 This is not to deny that the position apart may provide an opening typically more wide in some legal 
situations than in others. The situation most frequently instancing the exception, a declaration of 
emergency, is but an example at the wider end. Congeries of ‘exceptional’ laws can now serve the 
same function as that performed by the supposed exception to the law (see Hussain, op. cit., n. 2). 
Standard lamentations, such as Schmitt’s, about the spread of discretion and our being moved ‘further 
and further from the ground or juridical certainty’ (as quoted in Agamben, op. cit., n. 14, p. 172) 
manage to ignore the intrinsic ability of law to become other to itself. Even the most seemingly stable 
law carries with it a power of being radically revised or reversed. 
27 J-L. Nancy, Being Singular Plural (2000, tr. R. Richardson and A. O’Byrne) 131. 
28 This mode of sovereign appropriation is, of course, not the only way in which law’s dimensions have 
been or are combined. 
29 J. Derrida, Without Alibi (2002, tr. P. Kamuf) xix-xx. 
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assemblage or assembly, being together or “living together,” as we say’.30 
Transposing this in terms borrowed from law’s dimensions, the determinate 
dimension could be seen as calling for an experientially undivided cohering; the 
receptive dimension could be seen as matching the necessity for sovereignty, like any 
vital organisation, to responsively incorporate and assemble the multitude of disparate 
forces that continually come to (re)constitute it. For this projected assembling, 
sovereignty must be intrinsically receptive to plurality. To be so receptive, 
sovereignty must always be incipiently vacuous, always capable of emptying any 
existent content. So, appropriating another arcanum, Nancy would find that 
‘sovereignty is nothing’, ‘bare’, an ‘empty place’.31 So a ‘modern’ sovereignty, like 
its exhausted sacral predecessors, must marvellously fuse being determinate with a 
receptiveness prehensively subjected to that sovereignty’s unconstrained efficacy. 
Such a sovereign power can enclose itself yet extend indefinitely, subsist finitely yet 
potentially encompass what is beyond its existent content. 
To do all this, however, sovereign power cannot simply and purely in itself match 
the dimensions of law. It has also to be dependent on law. For the sovereign to sustain 
its being in an importunate futurity, no amount of the present assertion or exercise of 
power (‘exceptional’ or otherwise) would suffice. That being is of necessity oriented 
in a claim of right, a claim that projects sovereign power beyond its determinate 
dimension and attaches it receptively to what is beyond. Law, then, as the carrier of 
that right, provides this continuously projected, amenable and generally enforceable 
means of combining the determinate and receptive dimensions of sovereignty. In all, 
as the mutual contamination of Schmitt’s law and sovereign intimated, law and 
sovereignty subsist in a constituent mutuality. It is also possible now to reconcile 
Agamben’s contradiction. In its vacuity law is indeed needful of sovereign assertion, 
yet law extends beyond such assertion in the cause not just to its own but also the 
sovereign’s continuance ‘in being’. 
 
DEMOCRACY’S EXCEPTION 
 
Democracy, like law, finds its being in this position of exception – in an opening to 
what is beyond itself and in bringing what is beyond to itself. There is more here than 
                                                 
30 J. Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005, tr. P-A. Brault and M. Naas) 11. 
31 Nancy, op. cit., n. 27, pp. 36, 147. 
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a simple correspondence between democracy and law. Rather, there is an integral tie 
in which law creates, and continuously generates, democracy. The necessity for law 
specifically to do this can be derived from a seeming contradiction in democracy 
itself.  
Democracy is rule by the people, but the people in itself cannot rule. This is the 
gist of Plato’s complaint about democracy in Republic.32 He, or his dramatis 
personae, concentrate on the quality of the democratic individual, but they do so in 
order to derive the quality of a ‘corresponding…democratic political system’.33 Such 
an individual ‘indulges in every passing desire that each day brings’, submits to 
‘every passing pleasure as its turn comes to hold office, as it were’; and, in all, ‘his 
lifestyle has no rhyme or reason’.34 The corresponding political system is 
promiscuously ‘open’ and potentially ‘adorned with every species of human trait’.35 It 
is, in short, this illimitable openness that is the prime and impelling constituent of 
democracy. Putting this in terms relevant to modern democracy, for Lefort democracy 
‘inaugurates the experience of an ungraspable, uncontrollable society in which the 
people will be said to be sovereign, of course, but whose identity will constantly be 
open to question, whose identity will remain latent’.36 Hence Lefort’s thesis that the 
place of power in democracy is an ‘empty place’; and the empty throne becomes the 
‘normal’ condition.37 It is not, however, a condition that simply and somehow results 
from naturalistic traits that Plato, for example, would attribute to it – a crucial point 
that will now be taken up. 
The immediate problem is how the people, the demos of democracy, can assume 
any determinate existence at all, let alone a position of sovereignty. Democracy’s pre-
modern forms could resort to a defining force of the natural or of the supernatural to 
selectively constitute the people. With modernity, and as Lindahl incisively notes, ‘the 
people’ is incapable of coming together to constitute itself as a political unity and 
from there institute a political and legal order; rather, they come to be a people 
                                                 
32 Plato, Republic (1998, tr. R. Waterfield) 293-302 (555a-560b).  
33 id., p. 296 (557b). 
34 id., p. 301 (561c-d). 
35 id., p. 296 (557c-d). 
36 C. Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (1984, 
tr. J. B. Thompson) 303-4. 
37 id., p. 303; C. Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory (1988, tr. D. Macey) 86, 225-6; S. Žižek, For 
they know not what they do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (1991), 267-8. 
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through the creation of that order.38  So, this very people, in a feat of what Derrida 
would call ‘fabulous retroactivity’,39 is a creation of what it is taken in standard 
perspectives as creating, a creature of the constitution and of laws made pursuant to it 
– electoral laws, laws to do with citizenship and immigration, laws to do with mental 
capacity, and so on. What is more, law produces the definitive processes of 
democratic, and of sovereign democratic, assertion. Such production extends to the 
vacuity, the empty place of democracy. In constituting democracy and its definitive 
processes, this production does so in a way that  gives force and effect to this empty 
place. Law, that is, integrates into democracy’s form and processes the ability to be 
other than what it may determinately be at any one time. With modern democracy, in 
short, power is purposively constituted or constructed as empty.40 More specifically, 
this is achieved through law’s sharing in and making operative 
…a discourse which reveals that power belongs to no one; that those who exercise 
power do not possess it; that they do not, indeed, embody it; that the exercise of power 
requires a periodic and repeated contest; that the authority of those vested with power 
is created and re-created as a result of the manifestation of the will of the people.41
 
This generative emptiness, then, is embedded in democracy’s determinate 
composition – embedded as a template, no matter how varied its realization. The 
commensurate ability of democracy to be other than its determinate existence cannot 
extend to being other to this template securing its emptiness. Democracy then, and 
like law, imports an ‘exceptional’ position. It is oriented beyond and as other to its 
determinate existence but still relates and returns to that existence. 
 
DEMOCRACY’S EMPIRE 
 
Finally, then, to the question of whether this ‘normal’ exception accords with 
democracy’s empire, relating this to the promised case of the empire of the United 
States. The issue can be condensed in Jefferson’s conceiving of the United States as 
‘the imperial republic’. This republic was imperial in that the ability and even the duty 
                                                 
38 H. Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood’ 
in The Paradox of Constitutionalism, eds. M. Loughlin and N. Walker (forthcoming). 
39 Derrida, ‘Declarations of Independence’ (tr. T Keenan and T. Pepper) (1986) 15 New Political 
Science 7, 10. 
40 Žižek, op. cit., n. 37, p. 276 n. 52. 
41 Lefort, op. cit., n. 37, p. 225. 
 10
of the United States was to expand hugely, but it was republican in that the 
‘territories’ so acquired had eventually to be admitted to the union as new states.42 
Imperial expansion beyond the existent range of the republic was justified because of 
the eventual return to a republican and democratic fold. All of which may seem to 
accord with the exceptional quality of democracy. Indeed, democracy and its law 
could be seen in ways as attuned to the imperial. Their vacuity makes them receptive 
to imperial power, specifically to the assertions of the sovereign of the imperial 
nation. And their orientation beyond the determinate can serve the expansionary grasp 
of empire, law having long been part of the ‘civilizing mission’, even if democracy 
has joined that mission only recently. So, updating the Jeffersonian model to the 
current formation of American empire so-called, we finds its expansionary ‘influence’ 
is justified by the mantric insistence that, in the result, others will be brought within 
the fold of democracy and the rule of law.43
The grand solipsism of empire radically qualifies this easy correspondence with 
democracy and law. Modern imperialism has been and remains based on national 
sovereignty, a sovereignty bound in terms that are elevated exemplarily. So, 
Jefferson’s model, which was to be ‘an empire of liberty’, became racially qualified in 
its application leaving some indefinitely outside the range of achievable civilization.44 
Leaping over to the current scene, we find an imperium officially asserted in terms 
that are naturalist and divisive, yet transcendent. These are terms laying down ‘a 
single sustainable model for national success’; a model in which the market and an 
economic orthodoxy are enshrined as natural; a model in which certain attendant 
values are affirmed as ‘right and true for every person, in every society’; a model in 
which there has to be limited government and the ‘unleashing [of] the power of the 
private sector’; and, more generally, a model in which, conveniently, markets and 
‘societies’ have to be ‘open’, especially to foreign investment.45 This imperative 
                                                 
42 J. Wilson, The Imperial Republic: A Structural History of American Constitutionalism from the 
Colonial Era to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century (2002) 63, 73. 
43 E.g.: G. W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), 
Introduction; G. W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), 10-
11. 
44 Wilson, op. cit., n. 42, 107. For ‘empire of liberty’ see e.g. A. Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: 
American Expansion and the Empire of Right (1995) 22. The phrase was not quite so original in that 
the British had used it to describe their early empire by way of a contrast with the Spanish. The heavy 
historical irony is that the United States ‘empire of liberty’ was set against British imperialism, among 
others. 
45 Bush, National Security Strategy (2002), op. cit., n. 43, Introduction; Bush, National Security 
Strategy (2006), op. cit., n. 43, pp. 4, 27, 31-32. 
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openness turns out to be not quite universal. It excludes the United States which must 
always, so it is officially ordained, be ‘strong enough’ to counter any ‘surpassing, or 
equalling, [of its] power’: it must, then, ‘maintain a military without peer’; and it can 
use the ‘global commons’ (‘space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace’) 
so as to ‘project power anywhere in the world from secure bases of operation.’46 If 
this nationally enclosed predomination were incompatible with the ‘open’ quality of 
democracy and its law, then we would expect it to find an antithesis when it 
encountered the rough democracy of the international and its law. 
Such proves to be the case. To take a stark example, in his ‘address to the nation’ 
prior to the invasion of Iraq, a putative President Bush declared: ‘The United Nations 
Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours’.47 This 
self-elevation of the United States and of its conveniently constituted ‘responsibilities’ 
did not simply involve the embroiled question of whether the invasion of Iraq was 
‘legal’. The breach of international law does not necessarily or usually entail the 
assertion that, as here, one is superior to it, and superior to the institutions of the 
international community that create it. The quality of a breach could, however, be 
quite telling in this respect. Violation of standards, of human rights for example, that 
are taken to be definitive of the international community, or violation that would seek 
to undermine the hold of law and its processes, could evidence a hostility or disregard 
that affirmed superiority at least implicitly. That much could also be extracted from 
not only the refusal to enter into treaties of a like quality but also from the assiduous 
undermining of them. And activities of these kinds have been plentiful in the recent 
history of American empire.48 Any doubt that these activities are superordinate may 
diminish on a reading of the National Defence Strategy of the United States of 
America for 2005 where ‘our strength as a nation state’ is pitted against ‘those who 
                                                 
46 Bush, National Security Strategy (2002), op. cit., n. 43, Part IX; Bush, National Security Strategy 
(2006), op. cit., n. 43, Introduction; D. Rumsfeld, The National Defence Strategy of the United States of 
America (2005), 13. 
47 G. W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on Iraq’, (17 March 2003) 39 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 338, at 
339. 
48 See e.g. P. Fitzpatrick, ‘“Gods would be needed….”: American Empire and the Rule of 
(International) Law’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 429, 457-66. Another indicative 
instance could be that the United States has not notified any derogation from the provisions of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as provided in Article 4, despite being in breach 
of several of its provisions. Or perhaps it could not justify a derogation because Article 4 relates to a 
‘time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially 
proclaimed’. Cf. however Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant—Third periodic reports of States parties due in 2003: United 
States of America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/3, November 28, 2005, Annex I, ‘Territorial Scope of 
Application of the Covenant’. 
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employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and 
terrorism’.49
 
CONCLUSION 
Agamben begins his State of Exception with this epigraph, as translated: ‘Why are 
you jurists silent about that which concerns you?’.50 Perhaps the point of the question, 
and accusation, is that jurists should conspicuously condemn the disregard and 
desecration of the law and legal values in the ‘exceptional’ use of sovereign power he 
would instance with Guantanamo. In finding that the exception is not to but within 
law, this paper would question a silence that is more ‘normal’, a silence walled in the 
determinative elevation of naturalist and imperial categories that would deny the 
responsibility freighted with law’s illimitable responsiveness. A like silence 
diminishes democracy, as we saw. If being modern is to be in a ‘world of movement, 
of transformation, of displacement, and of restlessness, this world that is in principle 
and structurally outside itself, this world where nature does not subsist but steps out of 
itself into work and into history’,51 then one can only conclude, borrowing that most 
resonant of titles, ‘we have never been modern’.52
                                                 
49 Rumsfeld, op. cit., n. 46, p. 5. The terminology could be a tribute to R. Kagan, Paradise & Power: 
America and Europe in the New World Order (2003), widely hailed for its eternal verities about this 
‘new world order’, an order in which it is ‘the weak’ who place ultimate reliance on law, the United 
States having to be strong and act in ways untrammelled by law: at 38-39, 102. 
50Agamben, op. cit., n. 1, epigraph. 
51J-L. Nancy, Hegel; The Restlessness of the Negative (2002, tr. J. Smith and S. Miller) 6. 
52 B. Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (1993, tr. C. Porter). 
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